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REBEL WITHOUT A CLAUSE:  
THE IRRELEVANCE OF ARTICLE VI TO 
CONSTITUTIONAL SUPREMACY 
Gary Lawson* 
With Stare Decisis and Constitutional Text,1 Jonathan Mitchell has pro-
duced what I think is the most interesting and creative textual defense2 (or at 
least partial defense) to date of the use of horizontal precedent in federal 
constitutional cases.3 Mitchell’s careful analysis of the Supremacy Clause is 
fascinating and instructive, and he does an impeccable job of drawing out 
the implications of his premise that the Supremacy Clause prescribes only a 
very limited choice-of-law rule—a rule that does not, by its own terms, spe-
cifically elevate the Constitution above federal statutes and treaties. His 
innovative and intriguing framework yields four distinct conclusions about 
the permissible uses of precedent. In brief, under Mitchell’s analysis, the 
Supremacy Clause forbids using precedent (1) to invalidate congressional 
statutes (because congressional statutes are the supreme law of the land 
while prior court decisions are not) or (2) to uphold constitutionally chal-
lenged state laws (because the Constitution is the supreme law of the land 
while prior court decisions and state-law interpretations of the Constitution 
are not). Yet, according to Mitchell, the Supremacy Clause does not forbid 
using precedent (3) to uphold congressional statutes (because both the Con-
stitution and congressional statutes are equally supreme, and there is no 
constitutional mandate to prefer one to the other) or (4) to invalidate state 
laws (because neither prior court decisions nor state laws are supreme, and 
there is no constitutional mandate to prefer one to the other). The article is 
an eminently worthy contribution to a vibrant debate, and I am delighted to 
have the opportunity to respond to it—as well as to clarify some ambigui-
ties4 in my own prior work on precedent. 
                                                                                                                      
 * Professor of Law and Michaels Faculty Research Scholar, Boston University 
School of Law. 
 1. Jonathan F. Mitchell, Stare Decisis and Constitutional Text, 110 Mich. L. Rev. 1 
(2011). 
 2. As Mitchell points out, defenses of precedent are almost always instrumentally 
rather than constitutionally grounded. The rare exceptions to that rule have tended to focus the 
discussion of precedent on deference or history rather than the constitutional text.  See, e.g., 
Thomas Healy, Stare Decisis and the Constitution: Four Questions and Answers, 83 Notre 
Dame L. Rev. 1173 (2008) (discussing precedent in terms of deference); Lee J. Strang, An 
Originalist Theory of Precedent: Originalism, Nonoriginalist Precedent, and the Common 
Good, 36 N.M. L. Rev. 419 (2006) (discussing history).  
 3. Henceforth, when I use the term “precedent,” I will use it to refer only to horizontal 
precedent in federal constitutional cases. 
 4. An uncharitable reader might suspect that the word “ambiguities” is a polite eu-
phemism for “blunders.” 
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For all of its elegance and provocativeness, however, Mitchell’s analysis 
has one major problem: it places all of its eggs in one basket, and that basket 
simply cannot hold the eggs. Mitchell’s argument is all about the Supremacy 
Clause. But the constitutional case against precedent does not depend upon 
the Supremacy Clause. The argument against precedent would exist without 
the Supremacy Clause. While the Supremacy Clause provides a modicum of 
support for the argument, the clause’s presence in the Constitution actually 
has very little effect on the argument’s logical structure. 
To be sure, Mitchell’s contrary reading of my prior work is entirely fair: 
there are certainly passages in that work that seem to say that the case 
against precedent flows from the text of the Supremacy Clause.5 It is no de-
fense that I did not intend to make that claim; the baseline meaning of a 
communicative text is the meaning that would be perceived by a reasonable 
observer, and a reasonable observer could easily interpret my argument as 
did Mitchell. In truth, however, one can (and perhaps should) construct the 
constitutional case against precedent with no mention of the Supremacy 
Clause whatsoever. Thus, if my antiprecedent position makes me something 
of a rebel in the constitutional world, I am a rebel without a clause. 
I take this opportunity to set forth the minimalist role of the Supremacy 
Clause in the constitutional case against precedent, which renders much of 
Mitchell’s careful analysis beside the point. But nothing that I say here 
should detract from my admiration for this project and for Mitchell. The 
academy’s (I trust temporary) loss is most definitely a big gain for the peo-
ple of Texas. 
I. Deconstructing the Supremacy Clause 
The federal Constitution’s Supremacy Clause provides: 
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made 
in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under 
the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; 
and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the 
Constitution or Laws of any state to the Contrary notwithstanding. 
Mitchell is correct to point out that the text of this provision does not set 
out an express hierarchical ordering among the three named sources of fed-
eral law (the Constitution, laws made pursuant to the Constitution, and 
treaties made under the authority of the United States); it simply declares 
those three sources of federal law to be hierarchically superior to two named 
sources of state law (state constitutions and state laws).6 He is also correct 
that the clause’s reference to federal laws made “in Pursuance” of the Con-
stitution is most likely a reference to laws enacted according to the 
lawmaking procedures specified in Article I, section 7, rather than a refer-
ence to federal laws that substantively conform to wider constitutional 
                                                                                                                      
 5. See, e.g, Gary Lawson, Mostly Unconstitutional: The Case Against Precedent Re-
visited, 5 Ave Maria L. Rev. 1, 6 (2007). 
 6. Supra note 1, at 6. 
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principles.7 He is further correct that the Supremacy Clause says absolutely 
nothing about the hierarchical ordering among sources of law other than the 
five sources specifically named in the provision.8 That is, most of the key 
premises about the text and structure of the Supremacy Clause that drive his 
argument are correct. Mitchell is fundamentally wrong, however, to identify 
the Supremacy Clause as “the very provision that the textualist critics [most 
notably including yours truly] invoke for their attacks”9 on precedent—or at 
least he is wrong that such critics must invoke or rely upon the Supremacy 
Clause. Because his defense of precedent is rooted in the Supremacy Clause, 
it is actually tangential rather than responsive to the primary originalist case 
against precedent. 
The Supremacy Clause is a very thin reed on which to base much of an-
ything regarding the application of the Constitution. Indeed, if one actually 
tries to construct a general theory of precedent out of the Supremacy Clause, 
as Mitchell assumes that originalist critics of precedent try to do, one en-
counters problems even more basic than those identified by Mitchell. First, 
while the initial phrase in the Supremacy Clause, which identifies a hierar-
chy among certain state and federal legal sources, is perfectly general and is 
therefore addressed to all constitutional interpreters, the second phrase, 
which prescribes a legal effect for the preceding phrase, binds only “the 
Judges in every State.” That latter term is an obvious reference to state court 
judges, which means that the pure text of the Supremacy Clause does not 
issue legal commands to federal judges at all, much less to federal or state 
legislative or executive officials (or jurors, or citizens). Accordingly, it 
would be absurd to construct a universal theory of precedent that binds fed-
eral officials  out of a clause that does not appear to speak to those officials. 
Even if one stretches the term “Judges” to include federal and not just state 
judges, the clause would not appear to apply to judges in federal territories 
or the District of Columbia, since such “Judges” are not “in” any particular 
“State.” Supreme Court Justices, for example, would be bound by the clause 
only when “riding circuit” in a specific state. And there is no way to stretch 
the term “Judges” to include other officials. Thus, a pure textualist analysis 
of the Supremacy Clause yields far too narrow a scope to let it serve as the 
basis for a grand (much less a Grand) theory of precedent. 
Second, the clause elevates the three named sources of federal law only 
above state constitutions and state laws. It says nothing about the hierar-
chical status of state court decisions, state administrative regulations, or 
state jury decisions. Does that mean that those other exercises of state legal 
authority are not necessarily subordinated to supreme federal law? If the 
only constitutional source of conflict-of-laws principles is the text of the 
Supremacy Clause, an affirmative answer seems difficult to avoid. 
These problems with using the Supremacy Clause as the sole basis for a 
broad theory of precedent stem from trying to read the Supremacy Clause as 
                                                                                                                      
 7. Id. at 5. 
 8. Id. at 40. 
 9. Id. at 24. 
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more than it is. The Supremacy Clause is a provision that deals with one 
specific set of conflicts among sources of law that would predictably arise 
once the Constitution was ratified. It does not purport to exhaust the uni-
verse of conflict-of-laws principles, nor does it even necessarily establish a 
new principle that would not otherwise exist in its absence. Many constitu-
tional provisions exist solely or primarily for emphasis or clarification;10 it 
would be neither odd nor poor drafting for the Supremacy Clause to serve 
that function. It is clear that the Supremacy Clause cannot serve as the foun-
dation for a comprehensive conflict-of-laws theory, and because precedent is 
a particular species of conflict-of-laws problems, the Supremacy Clause 
cannot serve as the foundation for a comprehensive theory of precedent. 
II. Reconstructing Constitutional Supremacy 
So if the case against precedent does not rest on the Supremacy Clause, 
on what does it rest? It rests, as I argued (albeit with regrettable ambiguity) 
almost two decades ago,11 on exactly the same foundation as the case in fa-
vor of judicial review. It rests on the supremacy of the Constitution over all 
competing sources of law, including the other sources identified by the Su-
premacy Clause as themselves supreme over state laws and constitutions. 
This constitutional supremacy does not derive textually from the Supremacy 
Clause. One can perhaps invoke the sequencing of sources of law within the 
Supremacy Clause (the Constitution, then federal laws, then federal treaties) 
as some modest evidence in favor of the Constitution’s place at the top of 
the legal food chain, which is precisely how Chief Justice Marshall invoked 
it more than two centuries ago in Marbury v. Madison.12 But the supremacy 
of the Constitution logically precedes the Supremacy Clause. Indeed, it is 
the supremacy of the Constitution that makes the Supremacy Clause itself 
supreme over contrary statements in state laws or constitutions. 
The case for constitutional supremacy set out in Marbury v. Madison 
remains today as good as anything that has followed it. The case flows from 
a series of mutually reinforcing arguments, none of which specifically in-
vokes the Supremacy Clause. First, the very nature of a written constitution 
that creates a new government and sets forth its powers and limitations, in a 
pure and original act of legal creativity, implies that the constitution is hier-
archically superior to the laws and other institutions that spring from it. As 
Chief Justice Marshall explained:  
That the people have an original right to establish, for their future govern-
ment, such principles as, in their opinion, shall most conduce to their own 
happiness, is the basis, on which the whole American fabric has been 
erected . . . . The principles, therefore, so established, are deemed funda-
                                                                                                                      
 10. See Gary Lawson & Guy Seidman, The Jeffersonian Treaty Clause, 2006 U. Ill. L. 
Rev. 1, 29–32 (2006). 
 11. See Gary Lawson, The Constitutional Case Against Precedent, 17 Harv. J.L. & 
Pub. Pol’y 23 (1994). 
 12. See 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 180 (1803). 
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mental. And as the authority, from which they proceed, is supreme, and 
can seldom act, they are designed to be permanent.13 
Marshall’s point is implicit in the Preamble, which declares that “We the 
People of the United States . . . do ordain and establish this Constitution for 
the United States of America.”14 
To be sure, it is not logically impossible to have a constitution that is hi-
erarchically equivalent to, or even subordinate to, other sources of law such 
as ordinary legislation. The founding generation was quite familiar with 
constitutions that could be changed by ordinary legislation.15 But the federal 
Constitution, as a self-conscious act of political creation, is best understood 
as holding itself out, by its very nature, as supreme law.16 
Second, on a purely textual level, the Constitution specifically prescribes 
that officials swear oaths to uphold it. A provision of Article VI other than 
the Supremacy Clause declares that “[t]he Senators and Representatives 
before mentioned, and the Members of the several State Legislatures, and all 
executive and judicial Officers, both of the United States and of the several 
States, shall be bound by Oath or Affirmation, to support this Constitution . . 
. .” Article II prescribes that the president give the following oath, before 
taking office: “I do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will faithfully execute 
the Office of President of the United States, and will to the best of my Abil-
ity, preserve, protect and defend the Constitution of the United States.” 
Government officials are not constitutionally mandated to swear equivalent 
oaths to uphold laws, treaties, judicial decisions, or other legal instruments. 
Third, the particular terms and structure of the Constitution, which con-
tains some very specific provisions regulating the composition, character, 
and scope of the national government (and to a lesser extent state govern-
ments) suggest, as Chief Justice Marshall argued more than two centuries 
ago,17 that the Constitution is meant to control, and therefore be superior to, 
these other sources of law. 
While there is no deductively airtight case for constitutional supremacy, 
on balance it seems more plausible to suppose that the Constitution is hier-
archically superior to all other sources of law than to suppose the contrary. 
That is why Chief Justice Marshall was right in principle in Marbury to 
subordinate congressional statutes to the supreme Constitution (though he 
                                                                                                                      
 13. Id. at 176.  
 14. U.S. Const. Preamble. 
 15. See Akhil Reed Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 Yale L.J. 1425, 1431-32 
(1987). 
 16. So that there is no mistake, I am not making any kind of normative claim about the 
moral authority or superiority of the Constitution over statutes, natural law, judicial decisions, 
or anything else. I am simply describing the best account of the Constitution’s legal relation-
ship to other sources of law within the American political order. 
 17. See 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 176–77. 
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may have been wrong in practice about the meaning of both the relevant 
constitutional provision and the relevant statute in that case).18  
And once the supremacy of the Constitution is established—a suprema-
cy that can be established without use of the Supremacy Clause—the prima 
facie case against precedent is set. The “judicial Power” is the power to de-
cide cases in accordance with governing law. If the Constitution conflicts 
with any other potentially applicable source of law, such as statutes or prior 
judicial decisions (and I am granting that prior judicial decisions can indeed 
count as law in some meaningful sense), the Constitution must prevail. Ac-
cordingly, the power and duty to decide in accordance with law includes the 
power and duty to decide in accordance with the Constitution, even when 
prior congresses, prior presidents, prior courts, prior state officials, and prior 
scholars have said otherwise. 
Mitchell’s strict textualist analysis of the Supremacy Clause does not re-
but the constitutional case against precedent because the analysis rests on 
the false premise that the Constitution does not place itself hierarchically 
above all competing sources of law. It is true that the raw text of the Su-
premacy Clause makes no such direct and explicit claim to constitutional 
supremacy, but that does not mean that no such constitutional claim is made. 
As Vasan Kesavan has aptly noted, “It is unnecessary for the Constitution to 
specify that it is superior to other law because it is higher law made by We 
the People—and the only such law.”19 
III.  Un-constructing Constitutional Deference 
Of course, as a practical matter, the theoretical case against precedent 
only has bite if the power and duty to decide in accordance with the Consti-
tution includes the power and duty to decide in accordance with the 
decisionmaker’s own best judgment about the meaning of the Constitution. 
If the Constitution permits judges to defer to the constitutional views of 
Congress or the president, it is hard to see why it would not also permit 
them to defer to the constitutional views of prior judges. Such a practice of 
deference—and precedent is unquestionably a subspecies of deference—
would not involve “subordinating” the Constitution to other sources of law 
but simply “subordinating” one’s own view of the Constitution to that of 
others. While this is not the main line of Mitchell’s defense of precedent,20 it 
is implicit in his suggestion that relying on precedent, at least to uphold the 
constitutionality of federal statutes, is akin to deferring to the political de-
partments. As Mitchell says, “On this view, stare decisis is no different than 
                                                                                                                      
 18. See Michael Stokes Paulsen et. al., The Constitution of the United 
States 175–76 (2010). 
 19. Vasan Kesavan, The Three Tiers of Federal Law, 100 N.W. U. L. Rev. 1479, 1499 
n.99 (2006). 
 20. It is, however, one of the main lines advanced by Professor Thomas Healy in a 
characteristically engaging article. See Healy, supra note 2, at 1184–88. Professor Healy de-
serves a longer response than I am providing here, and I might even provide one in the near 
future. 
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a tacit expansion of the political-questions doctrine, a ruling that grows the 
domain of interpretive questions to be resolved authoritatively by the na-
tional political branches.”21 
I have elsewhere argued at some length that, with a few notable excep-
tions,22 federal courts generally are not constitutionally required to defer to 
the constitutional views of other actors.23 But are they allowed to do so? Of 
course they are—provided that such deference is a reasonable attempt to 
decide cases in accordance with governing law. There are many instances in 
which the views of someone other than the judge deciding the case are like-
ly to be more in accordance with the Constitution than the judge’s own 
views. In such instances, the judge is not merely permitted but required to 
defer. The same is true with respect to deference to the constitutional views 
of prior judges: reliance on “precedent” in this epistemological sense is not 
merely permissible but mandatory when it is the best available means of 
determining the right answer to constitutional questions. 
What federal judges are not permitted to do is defer to the views of other 
actors for reasons other than good faith attempts to get the right answer, 
such as theories of democracy, concerns about efficiency or decisionmaking 
costs, or considerations of stability or reliance. That is because the sole con-
stitutional power of the federal judge is “[t]he judicial Power,” which is 
quintessentially the power to decide cases in accordance with governing law. 
Unless the Constitution itself says otherwise, anything that involves decid-
ing cases in accordance with something other than governing law—and the 
Constitution is supreme governing law when it applies—is outside the con-
stitutionally granted power of the federal judge and is therefore 
                                                                                                                      
 21. Mitchell, supra note 1, at 34. 
 22. Most obviously, to avoid so-called “double jeopardy” issues, federal courts are 
required to defer conclusively to the constitutional views of juries when those views result in 
acquittals in criminal cases.  Less obviously, there is an argument that federal courts are con-
stitutionally obliged to defer conclusively to the constitutional views of the parties to litiga-
litigation when those parties all agree about constitutional meaning. Suppose that all of the 
parties to a case agree that the Constitution, for example, restricts the ability of state govern-
ments to regulate abortions, while the judge is firmly convinced that the Constitution contains 
no such restriction. Must the court prefer the Constitution as it really is to the fake “Constitu-
tion” about which the parties have chosen to argue? The question is actually trickier than it 
might seem. Article III does not grant federal courts a freestanding power to interpret the Con-
stitution. It grants them the power to decide cases in accordance with governing law, which 
includes as a necessary incident the power to determine the governing law. But the principal 
power is the power to decide cases. What is a case? Is it the operative set of facts that give rise 
to the dispute among the parties, or is it the set of propositions about which the parties are 
arguing? If it is the latter, and if the parties agree on propositions about constitutional mean-
ing, then those propositions are simply not part of the dispute before the court and are 
therefore not within the court’s constitutional power to adjudicate—even if those propositions 
are objectively false. I have begun a preliminary exploration of these issues in the pages of this 
journal. See Gary Lawson, Stipulating the Law, 109 Mich. L. Rev. 1191 (2011). A full treat-
ment of the application of those issues to Article III requires a separate article, which I hope to 
produce in the not-too-distant future. 
 23. See Gary Lawson & Christopher D. Moore, The Executive Power of Constitutional 
Interpretation, 81 Iowa L. Rev. 1267, 1272–79 (1996). 
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impermissible. To be sure, the optimal determination of what counts as gov-
erning law does not always require the judge to determine every matter from 
scratch; indeed, on some occasions that kind of lone wolf approach would 
be affirmatively forbidden by the primary obligation to get the right answer. 
But any reliance on other actors must be justified, directly or indirectly, by 
its ability to facilitate decisionmaking according to law. Any reliance on 
precedent that does not ultimately trace to getting the right answer to consti-
tutional questions exceeds the boundaries of the judiciary’s authority and is 
itself unconstitutional. 24 
Does that mean that the political questions doctrine is a mistake—and 
that, derivatively, expanding it through precedent would also be a mistake? 
In many, and perhaps even most, instances, probably yes.25 There are limited 
circumstances in which the Constitution effectively prescribes decisionmak-
ing authority over certain matters to actors other than judges. When faced 
with this kind of “textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the 
issue to a coordinate political department,”26 one must obey the Constitu-
tion’s allocation of interpretative authority. But in the absence of such a 
specification, there is no warrant for deferring to the views of other actors 
except a good faith judgment that those other actors are better situated than 
is the judge to determine the right answer. 
In short, with respect to interpretative authority, the constitutional rule 
really is: That which is not forbidden is required and that which is not re-
quired is forbidden. Reliance on precedent for any reason other than episte-
epistemological reliability is forbidden. 
IV. Constructing Constitutional Proof 
We can now see why Mitchell’s four-part schema does not accurately 
describe the constitutional rules regarding precedent.  
With respect to the use of precedent to uphold the constitutionality of 
federal statutes, Mitchell posits a constitutional equivalence between the 
Constitution and statutes enacted pursuant to the Constitution. There is no 
such equivalence. The Constitution is supreme—not because the text of the 
Supremacy Clause says so (it does not) but because the nature and structure 
of the federal Constitution gives rise to that inference. With respect to the 
use of precedent to invalidate federal statutes, Mitchell’s conclusion that 
such use is improper is right, but for the wrong reason. It is not because the 
Constitution is mentioned in the Supremacy Clause while court decisions 
are not, but simply because the Constitution is hierarchically superior to 
court decisions—and would be hierarchically superior even in the absence 
of the Supremacy Clause. The same is true with respect to Mitchell’s con-
                                                                                                                      
 24. As noted earlier, this may not be true if the parties to the case all agree that the 
court should rely upon precedent. See supra note 22, 
 25. I am not the only person to be deeply skeptical about much of the political ques-
tions doctrine. See, e.g., Martin H. Redish, The Federal Courts in the Political Order 
111–36 (1991). 
 26. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962). 
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clusion that courts may not use precedent to uphold state laws against feder-
al constitutional challenges: the conclusion is right, but that conclusion does 
not depend upon the particular wording of the Supremacy Clause. And with 
respect to the use of precedent to invalidate state laws, Mitchell is at least 
partly wrong. Where the best understanding of the Constitution is that the 
state law is invalid, one must invalidate the state law.  
But what if there were a judicial precedent that one believed was not the 
best understanding of the Constitution, and the state law would not be in 
conflict with the Constitution on that best understanding, but the state law 
would be in conflict with the judicial precedent? Could a court nonetheless 
invalidate the state law as inconsistent with precedent? I have no view on 
that matter. That would require establishing a conflict-of-laws hierarchy 
with respect to state laws and federal judicial decisions (and perhaps the 
“general law” on which those decisions are based). My argument establishes 
only that the federal Constitution trumps everything else. I have nothing 
interesting to say about the hierarchy below that level, involving things like 
state laws, general law, international law, and so forth.27 
But surely it cannot be the case that federal courts (and other legal ac-
tors28) must determine the right answers to constitutional questions no 
matter the cost in terms of time and money. After all, wouldn’t spending just 
a bit more time studying a problem always make it marginally more likely 
that one would reach the correct answer, so that it would never be proper to 
issue a decision without thinking about it some more? Doesn’t there have to 
be some kind of decisionmaking heuristic, or at least a proxy, that deci-
sionmakers can employ to bring their inquiries to an end?29 
                                                                                                                      
 27. I am prepared to say that Vasan Kesavan makes a good case for the priority of fed-
eral statutes over federal treaties, see Kesavan, supra note 19, but further the deponent saith 
not. 
 28. Everything that is true of the interpretative responsibilities of federal courts is also 
true of the interpretative responsibilities of the president and Congress. No federal institution 
has a monopoly on, or even a preferred status with regard to, constitutional interpretation. This 
means that presidents do indeed “violate the Constitution or their Oath of Office if they choose 
to enforce and defend all Acts of Congress—even when they sincerely believe that a statute 
contravenes the Constitution.” Mitchell, supra note 1, at 32. That “[t]he power to disregard a 
federal statute on constitutional grounds is a[n] . . . implied power” does not mean that it is a 
“discretionary” power. Id. Far from making the Constitution a “suicide pact,” id., this disper-
sion of interpretative authority is a perfectly sensible device for preserving liberty—just as is 
the dispersion of other governmental powers. See Gary Lawson, Interpretative Equality As a 
Structural Imperative (or “Pucker Up and Settle This!”), 20 Const. Commentary 379 
(2003). As for the expectations and demands of federal courts “that their decisions be enforced 
and obeyed, no matter how strongly the political branches disapprove of their constitutional 
reasoning,” Mitchell, supra note 1, at 29, there is a presumption of enforceability that accom-
panies judgments in specific cases. But that presumption is rebuttable if the president or 
Congress is firmly convinced that the courts are wrong; and there is no presumption of 
 correctness—or at least no presumption not grounded in sound epistemological considera-
tions—for the reasoning accompanying those judgments. See Lawson & Moore, supra note 
23, at 1313–29. If the federal courts have stronger expectations, those expectations have no 
constitutional grounding. 
 29. See Mitchell, supra note 1, at 22. 
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Yes, there does, but it is not precedent (or any other consideration that 
tries to substitute itself for the right answer). The trick lies in defining what 
counts as a “right” answer. It turns out that “right” answers for ivory tower 
scholars are not necessarily the same things as “right” answers for real-
world decisionmakers, even if all of those persons are employing essentially 
the same interpretative methodology. Real-world decisions always take 
place in a context in which someone has a burden of proof with respect to 
the relevant legal question and a standard of proof that he must meet in or-
der to establish his claim. It is proper for a judge to make a legal decision 
when a party has satisfied (or failed to satisfy) the applicable burdens and 
standards of proof—and that can happen well before infinity. 
The Constitution implicitly allocates burdens of proof, and it does so in 
precisely the opposite fashion advocated by Mitchell and, at least implicitly, 
by much of modern law. Mitchell argues that federal statutes come with a 
presumption of constitutionality while state statutes do not.30 That may very 
well be a good description of modern practice, and it may very well be a 
good description of the regime that Mitchell derives from the Supremacy 
Clause. But as a matter of original meaning, federal statutes come with a 
presumption of unconstitutionality, because the burden of proof initially lies 
with whoever claims that the federal government has the enumerated power 
to enact the statute in question. He who asserts must prove, and all claims of 
federal power logically begin with the assertion that the enumerated powers 
of the federal government permit the action in question. The presumption is 
precisely the opposite with respect to state laws. As far as the federal Con-
stitution is concerned, state governments are limited in power only by 
specific provisions in the Constitution denying them certain powers; states 
do not need to trace their actions to affirmative authorizations in the Consti-
tution. Thus, the burden of proof must lie on whoever raises a federal 
constitutional challenge to state authority. If the answer to a constitutional 
question seems indeterminate, then the legal ruling must go against federal 
power and in favor of state power.31 
The real question is how much evidence of constitutional meaning one 
must adduce in order to meet or overcome the relevant burdens of proof. 
The real question, in other words, is what standard of proof claimants must 
satisfy in order to win constitutional cases. 
I raised this issue in preliminary fashion two decades ago32 and have 
said very little about the subject since that time. The reasons for that long 
silence have not changed. I have no answer to that question. But it is the 
question that one must answer. 
I have not even touched on many aspects of Mitchell’s argument that 
should attract the attention of scholars in widely varying fields for years to 
                                                                                                                      
 30. See id. at 57–58. 
 31. I have laid out the constitutional and epistemological case for these presumptions in 
Gary Lawson, Legal Indeterminacy: Its Cause and Cure, 19 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 411 
(1996). 
 32. See Gary Lawson, Proving the Law, 86 Nw. U.L. Rev. 859 (1992). 
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come. Mitchell has given us all a very rich vein to mine. At the end of the 
day, however, precedent is still mostly unconstitutional—for reasons having 
little if anything to do with the Supremacy Clause. 
